Taylor West Weber Water Improvement District v. Jerry D. Olds, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, United States of America Bureau of Reclamation : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Taylor West Weber Water Improvement District v.
Jerry D. Olds, Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District, United States of America Bureau of
Reclamation : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Craig Smith; Bryan C. Bryner; Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC; Attorneys for Appellant.
Julie I. Valdes; Norman K. Johnson; Assistant Attorneys General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney
General; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Taylor West Weber Water Improvement District v. Jerry D. Olds, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, United States of
America Bureau of Reclamation, No. 20080504 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/984
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TAYLOR-WEST WEBER WATER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
JERRY D. OLDS, State Engineer of the State 
of Utah; WEBER BASIN WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah; and UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, 
ROY CITY, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
Civil No. 20080504-SC 
REPLACEMENT BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
HONORABLE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Civil No. 070904167AA 
J. Craig Smith 
Bryan C. Bryner 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
215 South State St., Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant Roy City 
Julie I. Valdes, No. 8545 
Norman K. Johnson, No. 3816 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Mark L. Shurtleff, No. 4666 
Utah Attorney General 
1594 West North Temple, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
Telephone: (801) 538-7227 
Fax:(801)538-7440 
A ttorneysfor Appellee 
FILED 
UtahStat6-fmmELlATE COURTS 
APR 1 5 2009 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TAYLOR-WEST WEBER WATER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
JERRY D. OLDS, State Engineer of the State 
of Utah; WEBER BASIN WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah; and UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
ROY CITY, 
Intervenor and Appellant. J 
Civil No. 20080504-SC 
REPLACEMENT BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
HONORABLE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Civil No. 070904167 A A 
Julie I. Valdes, No. 8545 
Norman K. Johnson, No. 3816 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Mark L. Shurtleff, No. 4666 
J. Craig Smith Utah Attorney General 
Bryan C. Bryner 1594 West North Temple, #300 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
215 South State St., Suite 650 Telephone: (801) 538-7227 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Fax: (801) 538-7440 
Attorneys for Appellant Roy City Attorneys for Appellee 
Utah State Engineer 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABI.FOE AUTHORITIES 
S, ' ;l NI Ol IIIRISDKTION 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES I 
STATEMEN J • •• . 1 
M i l M M U - i * 
BACKGROUND- Z>L AoW; REVIEW o r STATF FNoiNE; • , 
ARGUMENT 12 
1. ROY CITY DOES NOri .\,\ i ...I v. M As DEFINE! ION t )I• " P A K T Y " FOR 
BOTH STATE AGENCY ACTIONS \^M IUDU 1AI REVIEW « »|- THOSE 
ACTION.^  n 
2. INTERVENTION BY NON -PARTICIPAN LS1.\ M II: eoURI i>UL„. \ 1 
}<] V:FW OF STATE ENGINEER ORDERS WOULD EVISCERATE TH) 
STATE ENGINEER PROCESS AND DISKUFI 1 HE EXPECTATIONS Ol 
\ \ M ' " F R UTR 1 " ^'IV>' - i i i i^ : \ i r \CTED BY THEIR USE. . . 
3. , v i M I MIT ED ACCESS i o i HE D / 7 \ W 0 REVIEW PROCESS 
B\ PERMITTING "INFORMANTS" SUCH AS ROY CITY - TO 
INTLRVEN! * .-• > I \ ISCERATE TH1 SI A IE ENGINEER'S ROLE AS 
WATER ADMINISTRATOR < : " -> ' N :x! RMINE THF DF NOVO 
REVTEV 20 
CONCLUSION 
I AT EMI NT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: 
Archer v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995) 9 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745 (Utah 1996) 9, 18 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989) 7 
Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997) 22 
Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1983) 9, 10 
Eardley v. Terry, 11 P.2d 362 (Utah 1938) 9, 10 
In re Bear River Drainage Area, 271 P.2d 846 (Utah 1954) 6 
Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28 2 
Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765 (Utah 1996) 8, 16 
Maverik Country Stores v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . . 17 
Prisbrey v. Bloomington Water Co., 2003 UT 56 16, 19 
Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P.2d 922 (Utah 1949) 6 
S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) 8, 9, 15, 16, 18, 19 
Searle v. Milburn lrr. Co., 2006 UT 16 9-11 
United States v. District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County, 
238 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1951) 7, 10 
Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18 15, 17 
ii 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102 2, 5,14, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-103 2,4, 5, 12,14, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-203 2,4, 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-207 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401 8, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402 8, 13, 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-503 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 8, 11, 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-2 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-6 3,13 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 3, 5-7, 11, 13-15, 19,21, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 7, 8, 20, 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102 1 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-2-1 through 73-2-11 19 
i i i 
Rules: 
Utah Admin. Code R. 655-6-2 8 
Utah Admin. Code R. 655-6-8 12 
Utah R. Civ. P. 24 6, 16, 17, 19, 22 
Other Authorities: 
Black's Law Dictionary 1544 (6th ed. 1990) 6 
IV 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
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IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, 
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v. 
JERRY D. OLDS, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah; WEBER BASIN 
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, 
a political subdivision of the State of 
Utah; and UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, 
Defendants and 
Appellees, 
ROY CITY, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
Civil No. 20080504-SC 
REPLACEMENT BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(f) and (4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Can Roy City intervene on de novo review of the State Engineer's administrative 
decision where Roy City failed to meet the statutory deadline for submitting a protest and 
was, therefore, not a party to the State Engineer administrative adjudication? 
The trial court's decision on a question of law is reviewed for correctness. 
Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, [^2, 20 P.3d 895. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102(l). Scope and applicability of chapter. 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by a 
statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, 
the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern: 
(a) state agency action that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, 
immunities, or other legal interests of an identifiable person, including 
agency action to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, 
or amend an authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-103. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
* * * * 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative 
proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer 
to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or 
agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-203. Procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more categories of adjudicative 
proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by rule, 
prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings that include the 
following: 
2 
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except thai me agency may enact rules 
permitting intervention where a fedora! - in-iii* nrrule n uuire^ *hat :•: • !c 
permit intervention. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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the Utah Administrative Proceduies Aei iCAPA) defines "party" U include "all persons 
See I Ttah Code Ann. § 73-3-6 (West 21304). 
Utah Code Ann fc ii J i l \ 
3 
authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative 
proceeding."3 
Roy City failed to protest Taylor-West's application within 20 days of the 
published notice. Rather, the City sent the State Engineer a letter some six months after 
the protest deadline and after the State Engineer held a hearing on the application. R. 
178-179. Since the City did not file a protest within the statutory time limit, it was not 
a party in the State Engineer's informal administrative proceeding. Because UAPA 
explicitly prohibits intervention in informal proceedings,4 Roy City could not become a 
party to that proceeding. 
Displeased with the State Engineer's conditional approval of its application, 
Taylor-West sought de novo review of the State Engineer decision in the Second District 
Court (R.1-48), and appropriately named the other parties to the State Engineer's 
administrative proceeding as defendants in the de novo review. R. 2-3. Subsequently, 
Roy City sought to intervene in the trial court's de novo judicial proceeding. R. 146-148. 
After hearing oral argument, Judge Heffernan denied Roy City's intervention motion. 
R. 235-239. Roy City, by this appeal, seeks reversal. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-103(l)(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). The UAPA 
was renumbered in 2008. The substance was unaltered. 
4
 See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-203(l)(g) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). 
4 
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 U t a h C o d e A |1 IL § 73_3. 7 ( W e s t 2004). 
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 R. 178-179. 
\Str 1 Kali Code Ann fj 7VV7f 11 I i,A 'est 2004). 
9 Utah Code Ann. § 6HG-4«I02< i) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) . 
5 
Further, sound public policy supports excluding intervenors from de novo review 
proceedings. Allowing Roy City to intervene at the de novo review stage would permit 
an intervenor to bypass agency proceedings, undermine Section 73-3-7 and the State 
Engineer's authority to require timely protests, deprive trial courts of the State 
Engineer's expertise on certain issues, and chill the State Engineer's ability to gather and 
consider information from disparate sources. 
The City argues that Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs 
intervention and trumps the statutory requirement to protest within 20 days of published 
notice.10 But, a Court rule cannot contravene statutes governing administrative 
proceedings and court review of those proceedings. 
BACKGROUND--£>£ NOVO REVIEW OF STATE ENGINEER DECISIONS 
The State Engineer's Office receives thousands of applications annually to 
appropriate water, change uses under existing rights, and for other proposed actions. 
Water rights are treated as real property "incorporeal hereditaments"1 ] and are, by nature, 
"usufructary."12 Because the rights are incorporeal, Utah water law ties the right to a 
"beneficial use" that gives definition and substance to the right.13 The beneficial use 
10
 See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (West 2004). 
11
 In re Bear River Drainage Area, 271 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1954). 
12
 Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah 1949). A usufruct is the 
right to "us[e] and enjoy[] and receiv[e] the profits of property that belongs to 
another[J" Black's Law Dictionary 1544 (6th ed. 1990). 
13
 Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (West 2004). 
6 
essentially /*> uie right and, because most water rights «re iiicAtrieably intertwined with 
other v\ater nyhtv, the Stale Engineer is charged v!*V 'Vivestigating applications to 
appropriate i , lure appn^ .ng ilu n. Of special ii :i ipe :i lai ice ii i 1:1 le in: i vestigatic i i is 
wl letl :iei appi :) * • i \ « 'ill in 1 lpaii oil lei watei i ights l5 
Aypii^^liuLb io :ipr-»* pnate, Mich as the UJC at .bhi.c here, arc requesb to di\ert 
.a amount cf x\aler fi.Mii a specified source for a described beneficial use.16 The 
applh nun .. ^u ;., i. >,,< . •;*.;. i .igiucei • • - niialinj/ ill an 
• • . • -
!
- - •- . : i . .it UJ ihifc pjucess the State 
Engineer "shall consider" tii nely protests.17 Since no pi oU-Hants may appear, and gi\ en 
that some proposals arc quite complex the State Engineer may investigate an application 
on !.' - if 01 i ! iatic i :i j : >i otestai its si it i i nit u !l Ii i 1 lis 
i • -' ;. " i.:U I ujccj uuty gdihei information ft om disparate sources19 with 
u
 Sec I iah Code Ann. § 73-?-? (West 2004) (amended 2008 * and § - >-h 
(West 2004 k Supp. 200'?); Bunham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah N89); see 
also United Sidles v. DIM Hi t (\)un <.»/ the Fourth Judicial District in and jo* !Jt'ih 
County, 238 P.2d 1 132, 1134 (Utah \{)5 1 Hhcremafter U.S. v. Fourrh Distri. : 
Coun\("\hc |State] Engineer must investigate and hear e\ ideiKe ot ,al ..iiei. Med 
parties and ]u -h'U'ld ;.ni.',.\r <>? m o t [appropriation and ehangel applications"). 
16
 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-2 (West 2004). 
17
 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7(2) (West 2004). 
'
h
 •- •  " 8 0V- . ^ •> • ' npp.2007). 
19
 See id. 
7 
the goal of determining whether an applicant meets approval criteria.20 This 
investigation, combined with consideration of protests, informs the State Engineer's 
decision whether to approve or reject an application. 
State Engineer administrative proceedings are, by rule, informal unless otherwise 
designated.21 Due process rights are preserved by allowing a person harmed by a State 
Engineer decision who has exhausted his administrative remedies to seek judicial review 
of the decision.22 UAPA provides that a party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
a final agency action23 and that "district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de 
novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings" such as 
those the State Engineer conducts.24 This de novo review essentially replicates the State 
Engineer's process. To initiate such an action a person must have been a party in the 
State Engineer's administrative process.25 As the court proceeds with judicial review, 
it does not act as an appellate body, instead it "hold[s] a new trial rather than reviewing 
20
 For an application to appropriate, those criteria appear in Utah Code Ann. § 
73-3-8 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). 
21
 Utah Admin. Code R. 655-6-2 (2006). 
22
 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 (West 2004) (amended 2008); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-4-401 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). 
23
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(l) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). 
24
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402(l)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). 
25
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401; Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765, 770 (Utah 
1996); See also, S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990). 
8 
the informal record."26 While the Court owes no formal deference to the State 
Engineer's decision,27 "failure to make known the nature of one's rights in the course of 
an administrative proceeding clearly disentitles a party from raising its claim for the first 
time before a district court on de novo review."28 Before approving an application, the 
State Engineer must "determine . . . no vested water right will be impaired . . . . On 
plenary review, the trial court has the same obligation."29 In the judicial setting, "the 
applicant must proceed under and be governed by the same statutory provisions as would 
have been applicable had his application been approved by the state engineer."30 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined and reinforced the district court's role in the 
de novo review of State Engineer decisions, most recently in Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co.31 
where the Court said: "[T]he state engineer's decision to approve or reject an application 
'is administrative in nature and purpose[,] and the decision of the court on review, except 
for the formalities of the trial and judgment, is of the same nature and for the same 
26
 Archer v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Utah 
1995). 
27
 Id. 
28
 Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 751 (Utah 1996) (quoting S & 
G. Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1085 (Utah 1990)). 
29
 Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1983). 
30
 Eardley v. Terry, 11 P.2d 362, 366 (Utah 1938). 
31
 2006UT16, 133P.3d382. 
9 
purpose.'"32 U.S. v. Fourth District Court33 says it this way: "[the district court] should 
simply determine whether the application was rightly rejected. To answer that question, 
the court stands in the same position as the state engineer did. It must determine from 
the evidence whether [the application meets the criteria]."34 Searle summarizes: 
Accordingly, the conclusion is inescapable that a district court, when 
reviewing the state engineer's decision to approve or reject an application, 
is not sitting in its capacity as an adjudicator of rights, but is merely 
charged with ensuring that the state engineer correctly performed an 
administrative task. We stated as much in Eardley, when we 
acknowledged that, when conducting a de novo review of the state 
engineer's approval or rejection of an application, the court simply 
"determines whether the application should be approved or rejected and 
does not fix the rights of the parties beyond the determination of that 
matter." 77 P.2d at 365.[35] 
Decades of case law demonstrate that de novo review in district court is to 
determine, a second time, whether the application should be approved or rejected.36 The 
32
 Id. at % 34 (emphasis supplied) (quoting U.S. v. Fourth District Court, 238 
P.2d 1132 (Utah 1951), and citing to Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1983) (stating that when a district court reviews the state engineer's approval or 
denial of an application, "[t]he issues. . . [are] strictly limited to those which were, or 
could have been, raised before the State Engineer")). 
33
 238 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1951). 
3 4 M a t l l 3 5 . 
35S^r/e,2006UT16at<|[35. 
* See id. 
10 
applicant bears the burden of proof to persuade the court (initially, the State Engineer), 
that there is reason to believe the application meets the approval requirements.37 
Here, Roy City seeks party status, by intervention, which should be denied 
because it contradicts appropriate de novo review and contravenes UAPA's intent 
regarding who may take part in administrative and court review proceedings. 
In this regard, in addition to the State Engineer, who acts as decision-maker in his 
own proceedings, and whose joinder is required in the de novo review of his 
administrative decisions,38 persons may play one of three roles in such proceedings. 
They may be: (1) "parties," — i.e., the applicant and timely protestants; (2) "informants," 
who in one way or another become involved in the State Engineer's investigation or 
informal process but do not file a protest within the 20 days allowed under Section 73-3-
7;39 or (3) "non-participants" — those who neither protested, nor were involved in the 
informal process — in short, the rest of the world. 
Because the statutes are clear concerning the role of parties in the de novo review 
of a State Engineer decision, the analysis below begins there. After explaining the 
statutory law governing parties, related legal principles are used to explain the policy 
37/</.at!31. 
38
 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(2) (West 2004). 
39
 These might include neighbors who respond to State Engineer 
investigational queries, expert reports, or those who object to the application outside 
of Section 73-3-7, each of which could be referred to in the State Engineer's order. 
11 
reasons for excluding non-participants and informants from the de novo review process. 
A statute governs the State Engineer's role in such proceedings: he "shall be joined as 
a defendant in all suits to review his decision."40 
ARGUMENT 
1. ROY CITY DOES NOT SATISFY UAPA's DEFINITION OF "PARTY" FOR 
BOTH STATE AGENCY ACTIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THOSE 
ACTIONS. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) defines "party" as: 
the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all 
respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to intervene in 
the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to 
participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding^41] 
Roy City fits none of these four definitions. First, it did not commence the proceeding. 
Second, it was not a respondent against whom the agency commenced an action. Third, 
it was not permitted by the State Engineer's Office (the presiding officer) to intervene.42 
Fourth, Roy City could have but did not meet the statutory criteria to become "authorized 
by statute or agency rule to participate as [a] part[y] in the adjudicative proceeding." 
40
 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(2) (West 2004). 
41
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-103(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). 
42
 UAPA prohibits intervention in informal proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-4-203(l)(g) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). State Engineer rules conform with 
UAPA in this regard. Utah Admin. Code R. 655-6-8 (2005). UAPA's definition of 
"party" includes potential intervenors in subsection 63G-4-103(f) because both 
formal adjudicative proceedings and declaratory orders allow intervention. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-4-207 and § 63G-4-503(4). 
12 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (West 2004), which governs protests to applications 
submitted to the State Engineer says: 
Any person interested may file a protest with the state engineer... within 
20 days after the [Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-6] notice is published, if the 
adjudicative proceeding is informal; . . . . The state engineer shall 
consider the protest and shall approve or reject the application. 
A protestant who files his protest within 20 days of public notice of an application filed 
with the State Engineer's office, becomes a "party" by UAPA definition. But Roy City 
did not submit information to the State Engineer until six months after the 20-day 
statutory limit elapsed. Therefore, as Roy City concedes, it meets no criterion to be 
considered a party under UAPA.43 
Roy City argues that its lack of party status in the State Engineer administrative 
proceeding is immaterial because, in the de novo review setting the Rules of Civil 
Procedure govern party status.44 And UAPA does generally direct that during de novo 
review, proceedings are "governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."45 This 
argument, however, overlooks that UAPA also, and more specifically, defines "party" 
for the judicial review of agency actions: 
Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by a 
statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, 
43
 Appellant's Br. at 10, 12. 
44
 Appellant's Br. at 9-13. 
45
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402(2)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). 
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the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern. . . 
judicial review of the action.46 
In the judicial review of agency action, this more specific statute governs over the 
general direction to use the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in Section 63G-4-402(2)(b). 
Thus, parties are limited by Section 63G-4- 103(f) to (1) those who commenced the 
adjudicative proceeding (Taylor-West - by filing its application to appropriate water); 
(2) all respondents to an agency action (not applicable here);47 (3) all persons permitted 
by the agency's "presiding officer" to intervene in the administrative proceeding (no 
intervention was or could have been allowed here); and (4) persons authorized by statute 
or agency rule to participate as parties in the adjudicative proceeding (in other words 
timely protestants under Section 73-3-7, i.e. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District 
and United States of America Bureau of Reclamation in this case). Since Roy City 
agrees it meets no criterion to be considered a party under UAPA,48 it does not meet the 
definition of "party" for purposes of judicial review under Section 63G-4-102(l). It 
cannot, therefore, be a party in the judicial review of the action. 
46
 Utah Code Ann. 63G-4-102(1) (emphasis supplied). 
47
 UAPA defines "Respondent" as "a person against whom an adjudicative 
proceeding is initiated, whether by an agency or any other person." Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-4-103(l)(i). 
48
 Appellant's Br. at 10,12. 
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Those who miss the 20-day deadline to file a protest in the State Engineer's 
administrative proceeding49 may not intervene before the State Engineer and should not 
be allowed to intervene in the de novo review proceedings. 
Besides the statutory directives regarding party status, and thus intervention, 
sound policy undergirds UAPA and yields additional reasons for excluding Roy City 
from the judicial review of Taylor-West's application. The remainder of the brief 
explains the legal and policy reasons for UAPA properly excluding both "non-
participants" and "informants" from intervening on de novo review. 
2. INTERVENTION BY NON-PARTICIPANTS IN THE COURT'S DE NOVO 
REVIEW OF STATE ENGINEER ORDERS WOULD EVISCERATE THE 
STATE ENGINEER PROCESS AND DISRUPT THE EXPECTATIONS OF 
WATER USERS' AND OTHERS IMPACTED BY THEIR USE. 
In this matter, Roy City requests this Court to significantly alter the historic water 
right application decision and review process. It asserts that anyone, even non-
participants, may intervene in de novo review of a State Engineer decision. But, this 
would thwart the exhaustion doctrine, which requires parties to pursue all available 
administrative remedies before seeking de novo review.50 
The Supreme Court has said: 
The requirement of participation [in the State Engineer's administrative 
proceedings] as a prerequisite to standing to appeal is a corollary of the 
49
 See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7(l)(a) (West 2004). 
50
 Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18,118, 184 P.3d 578, 584; see S & 
G, /nc.,797P.2datl087. 
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doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is well settled under 
this doctrine that persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative 
agencies "may not, by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to 
such agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to 
determine...matters properly determinable originally by such agencies."[51] 
The Court concluded its opinion by saying: "we hold that [plaintiff] S & G lacks 
standing to [seek de novo review] because it waived its right to participate [in the de 
novo review] by its intentional inaction at the administrative level."52 This is consistent 
with the whole tenor of UAPA - to be considered a party, you must be a party from the 
outset.53 
Yet Roy City argues that the trial court should have overlooked a putative 
intervener's failure to timely protest the administrative action below because, in a de 
novo review action, Rule 24 alone may grant entry to an action without regard to 
participation in the State Engineer's administrative process. As Roy City states it, "[t]he 
Utah statutory and regulatory framework does not impose any restrictions on a late 
51
 S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990). Similarly, 
referring to a situation where a protestant filed almost four months after the protest 
deadline, the court said: "Clearly, Mr. Prisbrey lacked standing, as a matter of law, to 
challenge the change application proceedings, having failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies by filing a timely protest to the state engineer." Prisbrey v. 
Bloomington Water Co., 2003 UT 56, <I 26, 82 P.3d 1119, 1125. 
52S&G,lnc, 797P.2datl088. 
53
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401; Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765, 770 (Utah 
1996) (litigant may not skip administrative adjudicative proceedings). 
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protestant from intervening in an ongoing proceeding for judicial review . . . other than 
as set forth in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."54 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently explained, in Western Water, LLC v. Olds,55 
the importance of exhaustion of administrative remedies in the context of State Engineer 
decision-making: 
The basic purpose underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within 
its special competence - to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, 
and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies.[56] 
As Western Water demonstrates, requiring exhaustion allows the State Engineer, with 
his acknowledged expertise in water matters, to initially address issues related to the 
application and all protests taken together in deciding an issue related to the application 
before him. Allowing non-participants to become parties after the State Engineer 
renders his decision and to then raise any issue they find newly convenient denigrates the 
agency process, negates the role of exhaustion, and significantly increases burdens on 
trial courts to determine issues. 
The administrative process, on which applicants and practitioners rely, as well as 
subsequent de novo review proceedings in court, provide for the orderly allocation, 
54
 Appellant's Br. at 11. 
55
 2008 UT 18. 
56
 Id. at 18 (quoting Maverik Country Stores v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944, 
947 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
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distribution, and administration of the state's water. Without this orderly process, harm 
may result. Likewise, those who rely on the certainty of water right decisions — water 
users, lienholders, security interest holders, and others - would be significantly less 
certain about the outcome of what amounts to a wide-open decision-making process. 
Similarly, parties not only have the responsibility to exhaust their administrative 
remedies by participating before the State Engineer, but to raise their issues to him as 
well. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.57 requires that when an applicant initiates a State 
Engineer action, protesters must make themselves and their issues known if those issues 
are to be considered in subsequent de novo review proceedings.58 In Badger, the Court 
found that even requiring the State Engineer to discern, from his own records, which 
water rights a protestant owns "would eviscerate the requirement that it is the protesters' 
responsibility to make known the nature of their protest before the State Engineer."59 
Badger relied on S & G, Inc. v. Morgan in which plaintiff contended his participation in 
the administrative process did not matter.60 The Supreme Court responded: 
[Plaintiff's] interpretation ignores policy considerations which apply to all 
administrative decision making. A requirement of participation at agency 
level ensures that those who have an interest will bring to the agency's 
attention all relevant facts and considerations at the time the agency makes 
its decision. Moreover, the requirement of participation gives the agency 
57
 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998). 
58
 Id. at 847. 
59
 Af. at 849. 
60
 Id. 
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and the other participants notice of the identity and concern of interested 
parties.[61] 
Without having the relevant facts and all parties before it, State Engineer 
decisions are, in a sense, tentative, leaving trial courts in de novo review actions to 
discern what the State Engineer may have thought about this matter or that. Such a 
process is untenable because the State Engineer, the legislatively-designated water expert 
for the State,62 has no opportunity to deliberate and rule on vital issues raised by new 
parties for the first time in the de novo review setting. Thus, in the same way parties lack 
standing to challenge change application proceedings if they fail to exhaust 
administrative remedies by not participating in administrative proceedings or 
participating in an untimely fashion,63 they waive their right to intervene in the judicial 
review of such proceedings as well. 
Allowing Roy City to decide where and when it, or anyone, wants to become a 
"party" undercuts the 20 day protest deadline64 and significantly shifts current 
expectations of Utah water users who subject themselves to and participate in the State 
Engineer's administrative process. If a person may intervene in de novo review 
proceedings without prior notice, as long as he meets the relatively low standards of Rule 
61
 S &G, Inc., 191 P.2d at 10S1. 
62
 See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-2-1 through 73-2-11. 
63
 See id.; Prisbrey, 2003 UT 56, \ 26. 
64
 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (West 2004). 
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24, established administrative process is disrupted and those who rely upon and 
participate in the process, as well as other vested water rights holders, could be harmed. 
3. ALLOWING UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE DENOVO REVIEW PROCESS 
BY PERMITTING "INFORMANTS" - SUCH AS ROY CITY - TO 
INTERVENE WILL EVISCERATE THE STATE ENGINEER'S ROLE AS 
WATER ADMINISTRATOR AND WILL UNDERMINE THE DE NOVO 
REVIEW. 
Roy City "participated" untimely in the State Engineer action - it provided 
information to the State Engineer that the State Engineer mentioned in his Order. The 
State Engineer's Order points out that "[a]fter the hearing was held, Roy City sent a 
letter of concern dated October 10, 2006. While Roy City's concerns were considered 
in the development of this Order, the City is not considered a protestant with legal 
standing."65 Informants in an informal proceeding, however, should not be treated the 
same as parties who complied with statutory requirements to file timely protests. 
When the State Engineer receives an application to appropriate or to change the 
attributes of a water right, he routinely investigates issues raised by the application, 
including on-the-ground issues in the area of the proposed or existing water right.66 
While conducting such an investigation, the State Engineer often encounters and gathers 
information from non-parties who inform his decision and who may or may not be 
referenced in the State Engineer's order. While Roy City approached the State Engineer 
Appellant's Br., Addendum B, at 1 (emphasis supplied). 
See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1 )(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). 
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in the proceeding below, for de novo review purposes the City should be included with 
all those who provide information to the State Engineer but who, because they failed to 
timely protest an application,67 cannot influence the judicial review of the State Engineer 
decision by becoming parties in the judicial action. 
Because the State Engineer may investigate firsthand,68 and is not constrained, as 
is a court, to consider only the information that parties bring to his attention, he may 
consider all information that he finds, or that is brought to him. Such discretionary 
analysis differs from the consideration he gives protests filed by parties, however, which 
he must consider.69 In other words, the State Engineer, at his discretion, may consider 
or discard information he gathers in the course of the informal process - including a 
letter like Roy City's. 
The State Engineer has discretion to consider or disregard information brought 
to him by non-party informants. If all such informants could intervene on de novo 
review, the State Engineer would be constrained to evaluate all information, from 
anyone, in his administrative process, regardless of when such information is provided 
- depriving the State Engineer of significant agency discretion and authority. But, those 
informants who provide information in the State Engineer's informal process are not 
67
 See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (West 2004). 
68
 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1 )(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). 
69
 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7(2) (West 2004). 
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entitled to intervene at a later stage of the proceedings any more than a material witness 
is entitled to become a party at trial or on appeal of a trial court decision. An informant 
who merely shares information (or evidence) with the State Engineer, cannot thereby 
acquire the rights and privileges of a party who complies with applicable statutory 
mandates.70 
Once a party intervenes in a suit, the scope of its participation is limited only by 
the party's interests and Rule 24.71 This virtually unlimited right to take part in an action 
"encompasse[s] the right to litigate all [relevant] issues"72 and gives an intervenor all the 
sanction she needs to begin molding - indeed completely reshaping — a case to her 
wishes. Once ensconced, the intervenor may significantly impact the case, thus 
disrupting a sometimes precarious equilibrium between existing parties and introducing 
a very real "wild-card" into the de novo review. Even when it would benefit the State 
70
 See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (West 2004). Even assuming, arguendo, that 
non-parties may intervene on de novo review, intervention should be limited to 
informants who file an untimely protest that was, or practically could have been, 
evaluated and responded to by the parties and the agency before the State Engineer 
issues his order. Such a limitation at least provides notice to the parties of potential 
issues and would prevent a person from completely bypassing the agency proceeding 
- preserving some of the State Engineer's discretion in handling information from 
informants and allowing the State Engineer at least some opportunity to comment on 
the issues. However, as explained, even this level of participation renders Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-3-7 (allowing 20 days to protest and become a party) and § 63G-4-102(l) 
(limiting parties to those defined under § 63G-4-103(f)) void and minimizes the 
efficacy of the State Engineer's proceedings. 
71
 Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255, 259 & n.5 (Utah 1997). 
72
 Id. at 258. 
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Engineer, which is the case here, such participation should be disallowed because it 
makes the de novo review into a new and different proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State Engineer respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm the District Court's Order Denying Roy City's Motion to Intervene. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because the procedural posture of this case presents a unique situation that this 
Court should address, and because oral argument would help the Court understand this 
procedural posture, Defendant State Engineer respectfully requests oral argument in this 
matter. 
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